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Abstract 
 
Corrupt contracts are illegal and, therefore, vulnerable to hold-up. That is, a bureaucrat who has 
accepted a bribe from a firm in exchange for a license may still choose not to grant the firm that license 
(hold-up). This paper develops a model to study the role that intermediaries play in preventing hold-up. 
There are two types of firms, good firms that are legally entitled to receive a license, and harmful firms 
that are not. Without intermediaries only good firms enter the market, and harmful firms do not enter 
because of hold-up.  Intermediaries are legally permitted to help firms reduce their navigation costs of 
obtaining licenses. Thus, intermediaries increase entry of good firms. However, by utilizing the legal 
aspects of their transaction with good firms as leverage against the bureaucrat, intermediaries can 
prevent hold-up among harmful firms.  Thus, intermediaries increase participation by both good and 
harmful firms and their welfare costs are ambiguous. Data obtained from occurrences of violations of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are broadly consistent with our model. 
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1 Introduction
Corrupt contracts are not enforceable in a court of law and are therefore vulnerable to hold-
up". That is, a bureaucrat who has accepted a bribe from a rm in exchange for issuing a
license or a permit may still choose not to grant the rm that license. In order to avoid this
problem rms frequently employ middlemen or intermediaries to facilitate corrupt transac-
tions. Thus, it has been argued that eliminating these intermediaries may make corruption
more di¢ cult, thereby reducing bribery (see Lambsdor¤ [2011] for a discussion of this is-
sue). This argument ignores the fact the intermediaries provide many legal services to rms.
A recent OECD study on the role of intermediaries in bribery asserts that intermediaries
provide many legitimate services to rms" despite the fact that they also engage in bribing
foreign o¢ cials" (OECD 2009). For example, because of their experience, intermediaries
may be able to legally lower the rms navigation cost of obtaining a permit. Indeed, the
Foreign Corruption Practices Act of the U.S. acknowledges this by not prohibiting rms
from making facilitating payments for routine governmental action", including for issuing
licenses, "that are already required by law" (OMelveny 2009). However, intermediaries may
also be able to facilitate the bribing of o¢ cials (and prevent hold-up) in order to obtain a
business permit even when it is illegal to grant the rm such a permit. Indeed, as Lambsdor¤
and Teksoz (2005) state,
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a purely corrupt relationship is a rare thing. Corrupt deals are commonly em-
bedded in more complex relationships between di¤erent actors. More often than
not these relationships also entail a variety of legal transactions.
Other empirical studies of bribery also nd that intermediaries are employed to conduct
both legal and illegal services, sometimes for the same client and at other times for di¤erent
clients. Bjorvatn, Torsvik, and Tungodden (2005), in their study of corruption in Tanzania,
nd that former bureaucrats, who were red during an anti-corruption operation, become
intermediaries. These former bureaucrats use their former contacts to foster corrupt transac-
tions. In a recent audit study" of procuring drivers licenses in New, Delhi, India, Bertrand
et al. (2007) nd that applicants often employ the services of intermediaries in order to
obtain their license. In this context, intermediaries are employed to speed-up the processing
time for a license, and enable their clients to procure a license even without taking the driving
test. Although their study does not have any direct evidence of bribery, it suggests that a
signicant fraction of the fees that clients pay intermediaries is passed on the bureaucrat in
the form of a bribe. Furthermore, based on the results of a subsequent driving test, they nd
that both good" drivers (who should receive a license) and poor" drivers (who should not),
employ intermediaries in order to procure their license. Oldenberg (1987) similarly discusses
the role of intermediaries in facilitating bribe payments in a land consolidation program for
farmers in India. He nds that intermediaries are often used to pass on bribes to bureaucrats
from their clients. He observes that these bribes are sometimes paid to speed-up" perfectly
legal land consolidation applications, while in other cases intermediaries are employed to
facilitate improper or illegal land consolidation requests. Indeed, he states that the overall
transaction is proper even though the sub-transactions are corrupt."
In this paper we argue that the legal-illegal combination of the services that intermediaries
provide is a critical element of the mechanism that intermediaries employ to prevent hold-
up". We develop a model to show that intermediaries are able to prevent corrupt contracts
from being vulnerable to hold-up because they embed corrupt contracts within more complex,
partially legal, contracts. Thus, as Lambsdor¤ (2002) notes, many corrupt contracts occur in
the shadow of the law" where the legal transaction acts as a guarantor of the corrupt deal"
(Lambsdor¤, 2005). Specically, in our model intermediaries legally reduce the navigation
costs of seeking permits or licenses for rms. Hence intermediaries facilitate delivery of
permits to rms that are legally entitled to receive this permit. However, they also attempt
to obtain permits for rms that are not legally entitled to receive such permits. We show that
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intermediaries can exploit this combination of legitimate and illegitimate services to enforce
occasional (i.e. one-shot) bribe contracts even in the presence of hold-up (and without
resorting to innitely repeated play or reputations).
To understand our intuition more clearly, consider a model with two types of rms: some
that are legally eligible to apply for a license and others that are not. Both types of rms are
subject to navigation costs that can be reduced by hiring the intermediary. A corruptible
bureaucrat issues permits buts incurs some positive cost in doing so. The bureaucrat can
withhold a permit from an eligible rm unless it is paid a bribe (extortion) or grant a license
to an ineligible rm in exchange for a bribe (bribery). Both types of rms are subject to hold-
up by the bureaucrat. Since we study a single period scenario, reputational concerns or other
repeated game enforcement mechanisms" cannot enforce the bribe contract, therefore, hold-
up by the bureaucrat is credible. However, the institutional setting allows rms, whether
eligible or ineligible, to appeal (at some cost) to a higher authority (or court) to request a
license if their application was previously denied. Because of the existence of the appeals
process, eligible rms are not subject to any hold-up.1 However, since appeals are costly,
these rms do pay a positive bribe to receive the permit. The ineligible rm, on the other
hand, does not benet from the appeals process and, therefore, is likely to be held-up by the
bureaucrat after paying any bribe.
The solution to the hold-up problem is based on two key attributes associated with the
presence of an intermediary. First, the intermediary enjoys substantial economies of scale in
court costs so that once it goes to court, the costs of any future litigations are much lower.
Second, an intermediary can engage in collective bribe negotiation with the bureaucrat so
that if the bureaucrat fails to deliver the permit for a single rm, the intermediary can
renegotiate the bribe amount for the remaining client rms. Specically, suppose an inter-
mediary has both eligible and ineligible rms as its clients and negotiates a bribe amount
with the bureaucrat for a certain number of permits. The intermediary can rst process
the applications of the ineligible rms followed by the those of the eligible rms (the latter
acting as the carrot). The intermediary can then charge the rm an up-front fee and promise
1Our use of the term hold-up" should be distinguished from Lambert - Mogiliansky, Majumder, and
Radner (2007) and Choi and Thum (2004). These papers refer to hold-up" as the practice (by bureaucrats)
of denying licenses to rms that are legally entitled to receive those licenses unless they are paid a bribe. In
contrast, we identify this behavior as extortion and refer to hold-up as the practice of denying rms licenses
to rms after they have paid a bribe, and irrespective of whether they are legally entitled to receive the
license or not.
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to pay damages to the rm if it fails to obtain a license on the rms behalf. In the event
of hold-up (for any ineligible rm), the intermediary can approach the court to seek relief
from paying damages to the rm, and this triggers a renegotiation of the bribe which the
intermediary has to pay the bureaucrat for the (remaining) eligible rms. Since the bribe
amount depends on the court costs and costs exhibit returns to scale, this renegotiated bribe
is lower following any incident of hold-up.2 Thus, if the expected reduction in the future
bribe from the intermediary is greater than its benet from hold-up, the bureaucrat will not
hold-up the licenses of any ineligible rms. Further, the intermediary is never held-up for
any eligible rm as it can always approach the court to appeal against the non-issuance of
permits.
After studying the conditions under which the above mechanism can prevent hold-up,
we also study the welfare implications of intermediaries. We show that in the absence of
intermediaries only legally eligible rms receive licenses, and that hold-up prevents ineligi-
ble rms from entering the market. In the presence of intermediaries the navigation costs
for rms are lowered. As a result, more eligible rms enter the market. However, since
intermediaries also provide services to illegal rms and enable them to solve" the hold-up
problem, the number of illegal rms also increases in the presence of intermediaries. Hence,
the number of rms of both types increases in the presence of intermediaries, and to the
extent the presence of ineligible rms is welfare reducing, there is a trade-o¤ to eliminating
intermediaries altogether.
Although, to our knowledge, ours is the rst model to consider this mechanism using
legal-illegal interface, there is a sizeable literature on the type of bureaucratic corruption
that is studied in this paper.3 The majority of these papers study the policy implications of
bribery and do not explicitly model the transaction process of bribe contracts or the means
by which they are enforced. More recent papers attempt to bridge this gap in the literature
by studying the role of intermediaries. Bayar (2005), and similarly Bose and Gangopadhyay
(2009), examine the role of intermediaries in a model where some bureaucrats are corrupt
and others honest and where the identity of these corrupt bureaucrats is known only to
2Note that two types of appeals are possible in the presence of the intermediary. (i) The intermediary
(or rm) vs. the bureacrat: here intermediary can appeal to the court if the eligible rm is denied a permit.
(ii) The rm vs. the intermediary: The intermediary can appeal to the court to seek an injunction against
payment of damages to the rm in the event of a failure to obtain permit.
3See Mookherjee and Png (1995), Mishra (2008), and Samuel (2009) and the references therein for a
review of this literature.
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the intermediary (and not the rm). Firms that approach corrupt bureaucrats directly
may illegally receive a permit in exchange for a bribe, whereas rms that approach honest
bureaucrats are punished for attempted bribery. Thus, because of their knowledge regarding
the identity of bureaucrats, intermediaries lower the cost of bribery and are able to facilitate
corrupt transactions even in situations where most bureaucrats are honest. Although their
paper focuses on the informational" role of intermediaries it does not examine the role that
intermediaries may play in preventing hold-up". Hasker and Okten (2008) similarly study
the role of intermediaries in a model where rms may bribe bureaucrats directly, or through
an intermediary. Firms are subject to hold-up, but because of their repeated interaction
with bureaucrats, intermediaries are not subject to hold-up. In this context intermediaries
worsen the impact of corruption because they facilitate bribery even in situations where the
presence of hold-up would have otherwise prevented bribery from occurring.4
Although Hasker and Okten (2008) do not explicitly model the repeated-game between
the intermediary and the bureaucrat, it is clear that intermediaries who repeatedly interact
with bureaucrats can use trigger strategies or reputation mechanisms to guarantee that the
bureaucrat does not renege on the bribe contract. Dechenaux and Samuel (2011) study the
role of repeated play, while Besley and McLaren (1993), Carillo (2000), and Tirole (1992)
study the role of reputation in enforcing bribe contracts in the presence of hold-up. These
papers show that in settings with repeated interactions, bribery can be sustained despite the
possibility of hold-up.
However, it may not always be possible for an intermediary to repeatedly interact with
the same bureaucrat, and there are many instances in which one-shot (or occasional) bribe
contracts do occur despite the potential for hold-up. In the absence of repeated interactions
bribery may be sustained if the participants in the corrupt transaction can post hostages,
as discussed in the literature on incomplete contracts (Williamson 1983). Buccirossi and
Spagnolo (2006) and Lambsdor¤and Nell (2007) show that leniency policies towards whistle-
blowers can enforce bribe transactions in the presence of hold-up. That is, by obtaining
hard evidence about the bribe transaction, the party vulnerable to hold-up can use it has
a hostage" and threaten to expose the illegal transaction (without fearing punishment
themselves) if they are held-up. Thus, these papers show that a poorly designed leniency
4Other reasons for intermediaries have been proposed. Drugov et. al. (2011) nd experimental evidence
to support the hypothesis that intermediaries are used to lower the moral costs involved with corruption
transactions. See Co¤man (2011) for related study on intermediation and its impact on incentives.
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policy can sustain bribery even in the presence of hold-up.
Our paper is related to these papers in that we study bribery in the presence of hold-up
without relying on repeated play to enforce the bribe contract. However, instead of studying
hostage mechanisms we show that bribery can be sustained when the intermediary provides
both legitimate and illegitimate services to rms. In contrast to our paper, Buccirossi and
Spagnolo (2006) assume that only rms that are not eligible for a permit pay a bribe. In
our model both eligible (i.e. welfare enhancing) and ineligible (i.e. welfare reducing) rms
have to pay bribes to a license. Thus, bribery is not necessarily welfare reducing because it
may increase the number of eligible rms.
Following the introduction, the second section presents the benchmark model and derives
the equilibrium without intermediaries, the third extends the benchmark model to include
intermediaries. The fourth section considers various extensions and policy implications, and
provides a welfare analysis of the presence of intermediaries. The welfare implications of
eliminating intermediation are ambiguous and depend on various factors such as navigation
costs, court costs, degree of red tape. Further, we use the model to examine the role of
leniency policies in the presence of intermediaries. The nal section concludes
2 The model
Consider a model with three risk-neutral players: entrepreneurs (E) (also referred to as
rms), an intermediary (M) who plays the role of a middleman, and a bureaucrat. Entre-
preneurs are of two types i = fg; hg, where g refers to the good or eligible type and h refers
to the harmful type (that is ineligible for the license). There are total of ng and nh potential
number of g and h type rms respectively, where ni=fg;hg is a positive integer. Each rm
receives a private value of v if it is granted a license by a bureaucrat, where (v) is the proba-
bility density function of v, (v) the distribution function, and where (v) is independent of
fg; hg: Therefore, any rm can be identied by the pair (i; v):With slight abuse of notation
we denote harm generated by the harmful types by h; where h is su¢ ciently large (relative
to the distribution of v) so that all h type rms are welfare reducing if they are granted a
license. The cost of obtaining the license (in order to realize the benet v) is 0, however,
procuring the license involves some additional navigation costs  > 0 . Bureaucrats hired
by the government are paid a xed wage of w. The cost to the bureaucrat of processing a
license from either type of rm is e > 0. Bureaucrats do not receive any additional incentive
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payments for issuing licenses. We assume that both the type of the rm and the rms v are
observable by the bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are corruptible and attempt to extort payments
from g types and bribes from h types. Distinguishing between these two forms of bribery is
important because licenses should be issued to all g types and to none of the h types.5
Turning now to the institutional framework, there is a court (or some higher authority)
that can be used to enforce only legal contracts. Specically, if a rms license application
is rejected by a bureaucrat, the rm (or an intermediary acting on behalf of the rm) may
decide to appeal to this court at a cost . We assume that  is non-monetary, therefore, the
court cannot reimburse the rm for these expenses. We denote the rms decision to appeal
to a court by  2 fC;NCg (where C denotes appealing to the court and NC not appealing
to the court). If a g type appeals then the court ensures that the bureaucrat exerts e¤ort e
to grant the rm the license, whereas a h type is never granted a license even if it appeals
to a court. In addition, whenever the bureaucrat has received a bribe from a good rm, the
court nds enough evidence to impose a, possibly small, but positive penalty f:6 Implicit in
this framework is the assumption that a g type rm that appeals to the court (after having
paid a bribe) is granted immunity from any penalties for bribery. However, full immunity is
not necessary for our results, and we discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption in
Section 4.
2.1 Corruption in the absence of intermediaries
As a benchmark, consider a model without an intermediary. The extensive form of this game
is given in Figure 1.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
First, consider the bribe negotiation between the rm and the bureaucrat, which we
model as a Nash bargaining game. If an agreement is reached during the Nash bargaining
stage, the bureaucrat receives the bribe in exchange for agreeing to exert e¤ort (e) to process
the license. Thus, the Nash bargaining bribe is paid with the quid pro quo agreement that
the rm will be granted the license at some future stage. However, this Nash bargaining
5The bureaucrat colludes with the h-type to issue a license in exchange for a bribe.
6Note that there is no ne if the bureaucrat has not issued the license but has not taken any bribe. This
is perhaps more realistic than the case where the court always nes the bureaucrat. Given that there are
di¤erent types of rms, it is possible for the bureaucrat to mistake a g type as a h type and deny a license.
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solution cannot be enforced and a bureaucrat may hold-up the rm by not granting the rm
the license despite having accepted the bribe.7 We denote the bureaucrats decision to grant
(or not grant) the license at this stage by d 2 fY;Ng:
Within the framework specied above, if a bureaucrat holds up a rm, a g type rm
will always choose to go to court. Since going to court results in a ne f; a bureaucrat will
never hold-up a g type rm. However, h type rms will never choose to go to court because
appealing to the court does not produce a license. Thus, h type rms will always be held-up.
Let x denote the bribe paid by a g type in exchange for license. Then the agreement and
disagreement payo¤s are
Firm Bureaucrat
agreement v      x x  e
disagreement v        e
Given the above payo¤s the Nash bargaining solution (assuming equal bargaining powers)
x will be given by the solution to the maximization of the Nash product.
x = arg max
x=
( x= + )  (x=) = 
2
(1)
Thus, conditional on choosing to apply for a license, a g type rm will pay a bribe
x = 
2
: Since h type rms are always held-up, they will never pay a bribe in equilibrium.
Consequently, the bribe paid by h type rms is, b = 0:8
Given this bribe game, we now turn to the entrepreneurs decision to apply for a license
(and enter the market). Note that a g type rm can credibly threaten to take the bureaucrat
to court only if v > : Further, the cost to a g type rm that chooses to apply for a license
is  + =2; therefore, a g type rm with v >  will choose to apply for a license only if
v >  + =2:
Under the assumption of sequential rationality, we solve for the sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium of the above game using backward induction. It is clear that, for any g type
with v  maxf;  + =2g the following strategies constitute an equilibrium,
7The bureaucrat saves e > 0 by holding up. There can be several other reasons why hold-up might be
protable but we do not consider these and focus more on the implications of such hold-ups.
8It should be noted that, if bribing were enforceable then the Nash bargaining solution between a bu-
reaucrat an h  type will yield a bribe of v+e2 :
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fx = 
2
;  = C; d = Y g;
and it can be veried that this is an equilibrium satisfying backward induction.
We now turn to rms with v < : Note that in this case, a rm will never approach
the court and consequently will always be held up by the bureaucrat. Irrespective of the
outcome of Nash bargaining, the bureaucrat has no incentive to incur positive cost and issue
the license. Since v is observable to the bureaucrat, any rm with v <  will not apply. We
characterize this simple equilibrium in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 A g type rm applies for a license if and only if v  maxf; +=2g and h type
rms do not enter the market due to hold up.
Remark 2 If the navigation costs are small relative to the litigation costs (i.e.  < =2);
then the entry decision to apply for a license is only a¤ected by the litigation costs ; and
reducing the navigation cost  will not change the number of rms.
Navigation costs in our model may be interpreted as red tape, and it is often suggested
that lowering red tape can reduce bribery and increase e¢ ciency. Remark 2, however, sug-
gests an interesting nding regarding the e¤ectiveness of this policy. If the navigation costs
are low relative to litigation costs, then lowering these navigation costs will not increase
e¢ ciency by increasing the number of good rms that enter the market.
3 Corruption with monopolistic intermediaries
We now consider the role of a monopolistic intermediary (M) who can reduce ine¢ ciency
by lowering the navigation cost . Due to its familiarity with the system, the intermediarys
cost of navigating the bureaucracy to obtain a license is 0: A rm of type i = fg; hg and an
intermediary sign a contract where the rm pays mi to the intermediary in order to navigate
the application process (i.e. lower navigation costs to  = 0) and procure the license. This
reects Brays (2005) assertion that,
[b]y employing a local agent or a representative, companies can cut down the
time needed to get to know new markets and thus reduce the costs of operating
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there. Intermediaries may also act as a bu¤er against demands for bribes: they
can make their decisions whether or not to pay, according to local custom.
We denote the actual number of applicant rms of type i by ki; where ki  ni: If the
intermediary succeeds in obtaining the license the game ends. However, if the bureaucrat
holds-up the intermediary and does not grant the license, the rm receives damages D > 0
from the intermediary, unless the intermediary appeals to the court at cost T to avoid
paying these damages.9 Note that there two types of appeals. The rst occurs when an
appeal is made by the intermediary (against the bureaucrat) for not issuing a license. In
this case, the court examines the appeal and bureaucrat is required to grant licenses to the
g type rms, while h type rms are not granted the license. The second type appeal occurs
when, irrespective of the type of rm, an intermediary approaches the court to seek relief
from damages D: Note that because the intermediary provides both types of rms with a
legitimate service (reducing navigation costs), the court cannot penalize it for contracting
with the h types:10 As before, the intermediarys decision to approach the court is denoted
by ;  2 fC;NCg:
The intermediarys court costs take a specic form in that it depends on the number
of its client rms. Specically, there is a xed cost F that is incurred only once, and a
variable cost Z for each appeal that the intermediary chooses to make. Stated formally, let
(n) denote the decision by the intermediary to approach the court regarding the nth license.
Suppose (n) = NC for n = 1; ::::n  1, then the total cost of going to court for the nth rm
is T = F + Z: On the other hand, if (n) = C for some n= < n; then the cost of going to
court for each n > n= is T = Z: It should be noted that the logic behind this cost function
is similar to that found in Gintis(2009) analysis of a rms choice between hiring a lawyer
only if it is accused of wrongdoing, and keeping a lawyer on retainer" permanently. By
maintaining a lawyer on retainer a rm incurs only the marginal cost and not the xed cost
for its legal defense, whereas by hiring a lawyer only after it has been accused it must incur
9The damage clause may state that: the intermediary shall pay the rm D in the event it fails to make
su¢ cient e¤ort in procuring the license." Alternatively, the responsibility of claiming D may rest with the
rm. In section 4 we discuss this possibility and show that the results of our model are robust to this
alternative framework.
10It may appear inconsistent that the intermediary is not penalized by the court for attempting to obtain
a license for the h types. However, we assume that the intermediarys knowledge of the rms type is soft
(not third-party veriable), therefore, it cannot be responsible for agreeing to lower the navigation costs of
either type of rm.
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both the xed and the marginal cost of legal fees. In our model, the intermediarys xed
cost may be interpreted as the costs of hiring a lawyer on retainer. Once these costs have
been sunk, it incurs only the marginal cost for each appeal k:11
3.1 A market with g types
To see how the presence of the intermediary a¤ects the market, we begin with a market with
only g types. In contrast to the game without an intermediary where each rm negotiates
independently with the bureaucrat, here the intermediary and the bureaucrat negotiate over
an aggregate bribe Bg in exchange for a specic number of licenses. As we did previously,
we assume that this bribe is determined through Nash bargaining between the intermediary
and the bureaucrat. The time-line of the game is outlined below and characterized in the
extensive form game (see Figure 2).
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.]
1. In period 0 rms realize their value for the licence v; drawn from the distribution :
The intermediary chooses fees mg and D:
2. Given their valuation v and the fees mg, kg number of g type rms sign a contract with
the intermediary to help lower negotiation costs and deliver the licenses.
3. The intermediary and the bureaucrat negotiate (through Nash bargaining) over an
aggregate bribe Bg in exchange for kg number of licenses to be granted. In the absence
of any agreement, the bureaucrat chooses whether to issue any license. If kg number
of licenses are not issued, intermediary can approach the court at a cost T (described
above) in order to appeal the bureaucrats decision. Since the rm is a g type, the
court instructs the bureaucrat to issue the license.
4. In the event of an agreement, bribe Bg is paid and the kg licenses are granted if the
bureaucrat chooses not to hold-up the intermediary. If the bureaucrat holds-up and
issues l < kg licenses, the intermediary must decide whether to go to court or not. If
the intermediary chooses not go to court, it must pay D to each of the kg   l rms for
failing to procure the licenses on their behalf: If the intermediary appeals to the court,
the bureaucrat is forced to process the licenses and is penalized f for having accepted
11A similar cost structure is also found in Konrad and Skaaperdas (1997)
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a bribe. Conditional on going to court, the intermediary always avoids paying total
damages amounting to D(kg   l).
It is clear that in any equilibrium (satisfying subgame perfection) the bureaucrat never
holds up the intermediary and will always deliver the license (l = kg) if it expects the
intermediary to approach the court (i.e. if  = Y ). Thus, assuming the damages are
su¢ ciently large, which we determine more precisely below, the intermediary will always
approach the court if the license is not delivered. Thus, there is no hold-up in this equilibrium
with g types:
Turning to the Nash bargaining game, the disagreement payo¤s OB; OM for the bureau-
crat and the intermediary are given by
OB =  kge (2)
OM =  (F + kgZ): (3)
In the disagreement game, the intermediary approaches the court to seek licenses for kg rms
resulting in the payo¤  (F + kgZ): The bureaucrats disagreement payo¤ reects the fact
that it will be asked to issue kg licenses. Assuming that the intermediary seeks licenses for
kg rms, the bribe Bg will be given by the solution to the following maximization of the
Nash product.
Bg = arg max( B   ( F   kgZ))  (B   kge+ kge) = F + kgZ
2
(4)
We now compare this case with the previous case without intermediaries (eq 1). Note that
the presence of an intermediary a¤ects the rms costs in two ways. First, as discussed
earlier it reduces the navigation cost from  to 0: Second, if  > Z + F=kg; then each rms
extortion payment (now paid through the intermediary) is also reduced. Thus, assuming
that the intermediary does not expropriate the entire surplus, a rms payo¤ will be higher
in the presence of an intermediary.12
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the benet to the rm from the introduction
of intermediation depends on the total surplus generated by the intermediary and the exact
12But this is only a su¢ cient condition. Even if the expected extortion payment =2 is not reduced the rm
may still prefer a middleman because the reduced navigation cost may o¤set potentially a higher extortion
payment. Specically, if   Z + F=kg   2 , the rm will prefer to have a middlemen.
12
division of this surplus. The total surplus depends on the size of the navigation cost  and
the di¤erence in legal costs (  (Z + F=kg)): Note that the legal costs with intermediation
is a function of the number clients the intermediary has. Hence, this will number (kg) be
endogenously determined in equilibrium. The sharing of the total surplus will depend on the
bargaining between the rm and the intermediary. We have assumed that there is only one
intermediary and it chooses the fee to maximize its prot. Firms take the fee as given and
make their entry decisions accordingly.
Assumption 1: The intermediary chooses the fee m, but the rm can always exercise its
outside option and apply for the license on its own.
Assumption 2: Trade is feasible between the intermediary and the rm, that is,  + 
2
> Z
2
:
Assumption 3: The intermediary knows the distribution (v); but an individual rms v is
private information. We assume (v)  U [v; v], and that ng (v mv )  1 at m = + 2 ;where
v = v v:That is, v is large enough so that even in the absence of an intermediary, at least
one g type rm wants to enter the market.
Proposition 3 Suppose all potential entrants are g types. Under Assumptions 1 - 3, with
su¢ cient number of potential rms (that is, there exists ng such that if ng  ng) interme-
diation is protable and the intermediary will set its fees,
mg = minf
v
2
+
Z
4
;  +

2
g:
In this case the number of g type rms entering the market will not be lower compared to the
case without intermediation.
Proof. Assumption 1 implies that the following incentive compatibility constraint must
be satised,
 +

2
 mg:
Hence to set the fees, the intermediary solves the following maximization problem.
Max kg(mg) mg   F + kg(mg)Z
2
; subject to  +

2
 mg:
Using Assumption 3 we note that the expected number of rms that will enter the market
for a given m is,
kg(m) = ng  (v  mg
v
); where v = v   v: (5)
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Combining the previous two equations, the intermediarys prot function is,
ng  (v  mg
v
)[mg   Z
2
]  F
2
: (6)
It can be shown that the solution to the rst order condition is,
mg =
v
2
+
Z
4
(7)
Note that the intermediarys prot is strictly increasing in m at m = 0: Thus, either the
prots are increasing in m for all m 2 [0;  + 
2
], in which case the solution is mg =  +

2
;
or the solution is an interior solution given by mg =
v
2
+ Z
4
: However, this solution does not
guarantee that the intermediarys prots are positive. Specically, if the xed costs F=2 are
large, then the intermediarys prots may be negative.
We now show that under Assumptions 1 - 3, there always exists an ng such that for
all ng  ng the intermediary can make a positive prot. First, consider the case where
v
2
+ Z
4
  + 
2
; so that the optimal m = v
2
+ Z
4
: Since v
2
+ Z
4
  + 
2
; from Assumption 3 it
follows that v
2
+ Z
4
< v: A straightforward calculation shows that,
v
2
+
Z
4
< v ()
v
2
  Z
4
> 0:
This last inequality implies that the rst term in the intermediaries prot function (6) is
strictly positive. Thus, if
ng >
F
2
(v m
v
)[m  Z
2
]
= ng (8)
the prot to the intermediary is positive. Second, consider the case where v
2
+ Z
4
> + 
2
; so
that the intermediary charges mg =  +

2
: Under Assumption 2, the rst term in 6 is again
strictly positive, thus, if
ng >
F
2
(v m
v
)[m  Z
2
]
then the intermediarys prot is positive. Thus, there exists an ng such that for all ng  ng
the intermediary can make a positive prot.
To show that the number of rms will not be lower, recognize that the intermediary
chooses m such that  + 
2
 m thus, at least as many (or more rms) will enter the market
with an intermediary than without.
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3.2 Market with g types and h types
We now turn to a market with both g types and h types: Recall that in the absence of
intermediaries only the g types apply for a license, while the h types abstain from entering
the market because of hold-up. We now show that in the presence of an intermediary
h types may be able to avoid the hold-up problem and enter the market. Consider the
following time line that informally characterizes the extensive form game with both types.
The corresponding extensive form of this game is found in gure 3.
1. In period 0 rms realize their their value for the licence v; drawn from the distribution
: The intermediary chooses fees mg; D and mh:
2. Given their valuation v and fees mg and mh, kg rms of type g and kh rms of type h
sign a contract with the intermediary.
3. The intermediary and the bureaucrat negotiate over the total bribe B and the total
number of licenses k = kh + kg to be awarded. They also agree whether to implement
the agreed contract in a single stage or in a phased manner. In a single stage contract
the bribe B is made in one payment, where as in a phased contract part of the bribe
Bh is paid for the kh licenses of the h types, and another bribe amount is paid later for
the delivery of the licenses for the g types. If there is no agreement, the intermediary
chooses whether to make any license application on behalf of the rms and whether to
approach the court.13
4. If the bureaucrat does not hold-up, k licenses are granted.
5. If the bureaucrat chooses to hold-up it issues l < k licenses. The intermediary must
then decide whether to go to court or to pay the damages D to rms which have been
denied licenses: For the g types it can go to the court with an appeal for the license to
be granted. In this case the license is issued and the bureaucrat is ned f if a positive
bribe was exchanged. Conditional on going to court, the intermediary always avoids
paying the damages D.
6. If the bureaucrat and the intermediary agreed to a phased contract in stage 3, they can
renegotiate the contract for the remaining phase(s) following hold-up by the bureaucrat.
13Note that in the two-stage contract the intermediary pays the bribe before the bureaucrat issues the
licenses for the h types, therefore, the intermediary cannot hold-up the bureaucrat.
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Having solved the game with only g types in the previous section, we focus our analysis
on the h types: Recall that for the h types; the intermediary cannot force the bureaucrat
to grant it the licenses, but it can approach the court to avoid having to pay D: As in
the case with g types only, we rst study the negotiation between the bureaucrat and the
intermediary using the concept of Nash Bargaining solution.
Let kh; kg be the number of h types and g types who have paid the required fees (mh;mg)
to engage the services of the intermediary. If the bureaucrat and the intermediary fail to
agree, the disagreement payo¤s will be given by
OB =  kge (9)
OM =  (F + kZ) (10)
In the disagreement game, the intermediary approaches the court to seek licenses for kg
rms resulting in the payo¤ (F +kgZ): For the h types, it will approach the court to avoid
the damage payments, leading to a payo¤ of  khZ: The bureaucrats disagreement payo¤
reects the fact that it will be asked to issue kg licenses. Assuming that M seeks licenses for
k rms, the bribe B will be given by the solution to the maximization of the Nash product,
B = arg maxf[ B=   ( F   kZ)]  [B=   ke+ kge]g = F + kZ + khe
2
: (11)
Proposition 4 Suppose F > 2e, ng su¢ ciently large, and Assumptions 1-3 are satised.
There exists a two-phased contract where the intermediary pays Bh to receive kh licenses for
the h types, followed by Bg to receive kg licenses. In this case both types of rms enter the
market, and hold-up does not occur.
Proof. We prove the above result in three steps.
(1) First, we show that there exists a phased contract where the intermediary rst pays
Bh for kh licenses for the h types, followed by Bg for kg licenses, where Bh = (khZ + khe)=2
and Bg = (F + kgZ)=2:
Suppose the bureaucrat holds up the intermediary and issues l < kh licenses in the rst
phase. This will cost the intermediary a total of (kh  l)D in damages. Even if there is only
one h type; as long as D > Z+ F
2
; the intermediary will choose to approach the court to avoid
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paying damages.14 We assume that D satises this constraint so that the intermediary can
commit itself to go to court. Following hold-up, the intermediary renegotiates the (second
stage bribe) bribe for the remaining kg rms. This renegotiated bribe is also determined
through Nash bargaining, but disagreement payo¤s for the bureaucrat and the intermediary
are now OB =  kge and OM =  (kgZ) respectively. Hence the renegotiated bribe is
Brg = kgZ=2:
In the second stage, upon payment of Brg the bureaucrat will issue kg licenses. Hold-up is
not protable at this stage because the intermediary can always go to court to seek licenses
for the g types. Further, since a bribe has been exchanged, the bureaucrat will incur a
penalty f > 0: Hence, hold-up is never optimal. Since the bureaucrat does not hold-up in
the second stage, its expected payo¤ from holding up in the rst stage decreases by F=2;
but its benet from holding up is (kh   l)e: Since benets from holding up is maximized for
l = 0; hold up will not occur in the rst stage if F=2  khe; or 2khe  F:
(2) Hold-up will not be protable as long as kg  1: Recall that the equilibrium number
of rms of each type depend on ni and the fee mi: The fees charged must be large enough to
cover the intermediarys bribe payment B, which is additively separable in kg and kh: Thus,
the fraction of the bribe B ( see 11) that is allocated in the rst stage towards procuring the
licenses for the h types will not a¤ect the intermediarys prot maximizing choice of mg; and
in turn the number of g types that apply for a licenses (kg). Hence, the middlemans prot
from the h types will not depend on the number of g types (and vice-versa) and mg will
be determined exactly as in proposition 3. It can be shown that mg = minfv2 + Z4 ;  + 2g;
kg = ng  (v m

g
v
); and Assumption 3 ensures that kg  1:
Next, we determine the fees that will be charged by the intermediary for the h types:
The middleman will choose mh to solve the following maximization problem.
Max kh(mh) mh   kh(mh)(Z + e)
2
; subject to kh(mh)  F
2e
:
Note that the constraint is the no hold-up" constraint that ensures that the bureaucrat
does not hold-up. A straightforward calculation shows that,
mh =
v
2
+
(Z + e)
4
(12)
14This inequality is solved for the existence of at least one h type. Note that it only incorporates half the
xed cost (F=2) because the rest of this cost is recovered through the renegotiated bribe payments for the
second phase. (i.e. the renegotiated bribe falls by F=2):
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Substituting this into the constraint implies that,
nh  (v  m

h
v
)  F
2e
: (13)
Condition F > 2e is clearly necessary to ensure that there are some h types in the
market.15
(3) Finally, we determine conditions that ensure that the intermediarys prot is positive.
First, note that we must have v > mh;otherwise none of the h types would apply for a license.
Now, using (7) & (13), it can be shown that the intermediarys prot is,
fng  (
v  mg
v
)(mg  
Z
2
)g+ fnh  (v  m

h
v
)(mh  
Z + e
2
)g   F
2
; (14)
which is strictly positive only if,
ng 
F
2
  fnh  (v m

h
v
)(mh   Z+e2 )g
(
v mg
v
)(mg   Z2 )
= ng: (15)
The above result shows that the presence of an intermediary (along with g types) makes
it possible for the h types to enter the market, when previously they would not have been
able to do so. Thus, both h types and intermediaries benet from this transaction.
We study inequality (15) to understand the implications of the previous proposition.
Observe that (15) is weaker than the protability condition (8) for ng derived in proposition
3; that is, ng < ng: When ng  ng the intermediary receives the same prots from g types
because mg is the same regardless of whether both types of rms are present or absent, and
a strictly positive prot from h types:When ng 2 ( ng; ng); then the intermediary is able to
receive a positive prot from g types, when previously it would not have o¤ered its services
to good rms. Thus, in this case it receives positive prots from g types, in addition to the
prot it receives from h types. Consequently, its prots are always strictly higher in the
presence of both types of rms, which implies that whenever the potential number of good
rms (ng) is su¢ ciently large (> ng), it will also want to o¤er its services to h types. Second,
15Although we focus only on a two stage bribe, several multi-stage contracts are feasible. Indeed, the
aggregate bribe B (as in 11) can be partitioned into several payments made at each stage. However, regardless
of the number of stages, the total bribe (in the absence of hold-up) must be equal to B: If hold-up were
to occur at some stage, the renegotiated bribe will always be always be reduced by F=2; regardless of the
number of stages.
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this result implies that are values of ng 2 ( ng; ng); where intermediaries would be absent in
the presence of only g type rms, but where they are present if there are both g and h type
rms. Thus, interestingly, when ng 2 ( ng; ng); the presence of h types increases the number
of g types that enter the market. The following corollary summarizes these results.
Corollary 5 The presence of h type rms increases the range over which intermediaries
are willing to provide services for g type rms. Further, the intermediarys prot is always
higher from serving both types of rms.
Intuitively, in the absence of h types the intermediary o¤ers its services to g types only
when there are su¢ ciently many potential g types (i.e. ng su¢ ciently large). However, when
both types of rms are present, the intermediary cross-subsidizes the prots obtained from
providing its services to h types; in order to provide its services to g types even when there
are relatively few g types present.
4 Discussion and Extensions
In the absence of intermediaries, hold-up is a blessing-in-disguise" because it prevents cor-
ruption and entry of the h type rms.16 The previous sections have shown how interme-
diation can solve the hold-up problem and encourage corruption. In this section we study
the welfare implications of intermediaries, and the various policies that the government may
adopt in order to regulate intermediaries and prevent corruption. We also o¤er a variation
of our model in which the responsibility of of suing the intermediary rests with the rm We
also o¤er some empirical evidence in support of our model.
4.1 Welfare
Assume that v > e and that the harm h from the h types is greater than v: These two
conditions ensure that in the rst best world the regulator will want to grant licenses to all g
types and to none of the h types:This immediately implies that the presence of intermediaries
is always welfare enhancing when there are only g types (see Proposition 3). Sincemg  +2 ;
16This is in sharp contrast to the hold-up problems in the context of legal contracts where, hold-up
possibilities can lead to under-investment.
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the number of rms entering the market will always be (weakly) greater with an intermediary
than without. The more interesting case is when there are both g and h types: Since the
presence of h types increase the range over which intermediaries provide services for g types,
it suggests that the welfare gain from g types will be realized even for smaller values of ng:
However, since there are welfare losses from h types and intermediaries facilitate the entry
of these h types, the overall welfare implications of intermediaries will be ambiguous when
there are both types of rms.
Formally, with both types of rms, the social welfare (SW) in the presence of an inter-
mediary is given by
SW = ng
vZ
mg
v (v)dv +
v
nh
Z
mh
(v   h) (v)dv:
Under Assumptions 1 - 3, this above expression simplies to
ng
2v
((v)2   (mg)2) +
nh
2v
((v)2   (mh)2) 
nhh
v
(v  mh): (16)
Since h > v > mh > m

g; the above expression may be positive or negative.
In the absence of an intermediary, the social welfare is
v
ng
Z
+
2
v (v)dv;
which simplies to
ng
2v
((v)2   ( + 
2
)2): (17)
To avoid biasing our results, we assume that ng = nh: Under this assumption an intermediary
is welfare enhancing if and only if the following condition is satised
1
2v
((v)2   (mg)2) +
1
2v
((v)2   (mh)2) 
h
v
(v  mg) >
1
2v
((v)2   ( + 
2
)2)
which simplies to,
v2  mg2  mh2   2hv + 2hmh + ( +

2
)2 > 0: (18)
Note that the above inequality may hold for certain parameter values and eliminating inter-
mediaries may result in welfare losses to society.17 Hence it is not always optimal to eliminate
17In the case of the following example, welfare is improved with an intermediary. v = 3; v = 1; Z = :5; e =
:2;  = 2;  = 1; h = 3; F = 4; ng = nh = 5: The net gain in social welfare with an intermediary is, 1:85, the
intermediarys prot is 7:11, the expected number of g types who enter the market 3:4, and h types 2:2: All
other constraints can also be shown to be satised.
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intermediaries, even though this reduces corruption. We now study the comparative statics
of the above expression
Proposition 6 There exists a   0; such that for all  > ; the presence of an intermediary
improves welfare. Furthermore, the (welfare) gains from an intermediary are increasing in
e, ; and : They are increasing in z if and only if (h  v) > Z
2
+ e
4
Proof. The welfare gains from an intermediary are increasing in : Thus, for some
su¢ ciently large  the presence of an intermediary will raise welfare (relative to the case
without an intermediary). Substituting the expressions for mh and m

g; into the expression
v2 mg2 mh2  2hv+ 2hmh + ( + 2 )2; and taking the derivative yields the above results.
The welfare from allowing intermediaries to function is larger when the navigation costs
 are large because intermediaries eliminate these navigation costs. (This is despite the fact
that intermediaries lower the navigation costs for both good and harmful types.) Further,
the welfare gain from an intermediary is increasing in the individual rms court costs ()
because rms are able to outsource" their legal expenses to an intermediary and exploit
the intermediarys economies of scale. Interestingly, an increase in e (the bureaucrats cost
of e¤ort) also raises the welfare gains from an intermediary. This occurs because an increase
in e increases the fee that the intermediary charges the h types but does not a¤ect the fee
that it charges the g types: Thus, an increase in e reduces the participation of h types while
not a¤ecting the participation of g types; therefore, a higher e increases the welfare gains
from an intermediary. If we interpret e broadly as red-tape, then our model suggests that
an increase in red-tape will, surprisingly, raise welfare because it decreases the participation
among h types, while not a¤ecting the participation of g types.
4.2 Leniency Policies
Our framework implicitly assumes that the government o¤ers leniency to any entrepreneurs
who appeal to the court. Such leniency policies have attracted considerable attention recently.
Basu (2011) recommends that bribe giving should be made legal (while bribe taking remain
illegal) in order to encourage bribe givers to cooperate with the authorities and expose bribe
takers. However, the e¤ectiveness of leniency policies has been contested elsewhere in the
literature (Spagnolo, 2004). Indeed, it may be argued that although leniency policies should
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be applied towards individual rms, they should not be applied towards intermediaries. In
this section, we evaluate the e¤ectiveness of leniency policies towards both entrepreneurs
and intermediaries.
Consider a model with only g types and absent an intermediary. Suppose that entrepre-
neurs are not granted leniency, but are ned fE > 0 when they go to court to appeal the
bureaucrats decision to not grant them the license after having paid a positive bribe. The
model described in section 3 assumes that fE = 0; which we will take to be the case with
a leniency policy. The following result identies the welfare implications of introducing a
leniency policy.
Proposition 7 Suppose all rms are g types; then a leniency policy that sets fE = 0 will
never lower welfare. It will always raise welfare if the navigation costs () are su¢ ciently
small.
Proof. We prove this result by showing that choosing to set fE > 0 never increases the
expected number of rms that will enter the market. Therefore, choosing fE = 0 will never
lower welfare.
Following the reasoning o¤ered in the proof of Lemma 1, a rm that pays a positive bribe
will be enter the market only if it can credibly threaten to take the inspector to court. Hence,
conditional on paying a positive bribe, v must be greater than + fE: Firms that choose to
pay a positive bribe will enter the market only if their v is larger than their expected costs
 + 
2
: Thus, rms that enter the market and pay a positive bribe (x > 0) must satisfy the
condition: v > maxf+ 
2
; +fEg: Of course, given that there are now penalties for bribery,
a rm may instead choose to pay no bribe and, conditional on its application being rejected,
go to court to appeal this decision. A rm that chooses to pay x = 0 will enter the market
only if v >  + :
For rms that choose to pay a positive bribe, there are now two possible cases: (a) + 
2
>
+fE ;or (b) + 2 < +fE: First consider case (a). In this case, if v > maxf+ 2 ; +fEg;
the constraint v >  + fE is not binding, therefore, a leniency policy will have no a¤ect
on the expected number of rms that will enter the market. All rms with v >  + 
2
will enter the market and pay a bribe x = 
2
: Bureaucrats will not hold-up the rm since
v >  + 
2
> + fE: That is, since v > + fE; the rm can credibly threaten to go to court.
For rms with v <  + 
2
; note that this condition implies that v <  + : Since  +  is the
total cost of entering the market for these rms, rms with v <  + 
2
<  +  will never
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enter the market even if they were to pay x = 0: Thus, the only rms with v   + 
2
enter
the market. Next consider case (b) where  + 
2
< + fE: Here there are two further (sub)
cases: (i) If  + 
2
<  +  < + fE; then rms with v 2 ( + ; + fE) will choose x = 0;
and will enter the market. Thus, in this case, all rms with v   +  will enter the market,
and a decrease in fE will have no a¤ect on the number of rms. (ii) + 2 < +fE < +;
then only rms with v > + fE will enter the market and pay a positive bribe. In this case
a decrease in fE will raise the number of rms (and increase welfare).
In case (a) and (b, i) the expected number of rms is not a¤ected by fE, whereas in case
(b, ii) the expected number of rms that enter the market will be lower when fE > 0; than
when fE = 0. Thus, it follows that a leniency policy, which sets fE = 0 can never lower
welfare.
Having shown that leniency policies are never welfare reducing in the absence of inter-
mediaries, we now examine whether a regulator will nd it optimal to extend these policies
to intermediaries. Consider the model with intermediaries in the presence of only g types:
Recall that intermediaries may go to court at cost F + kZ in order to appeal the bureau-
crats decision to deny the license. Suppose that the intermediary is not granted leniency,
but is ned fM > 0 for having paid a bribe B = F+kZ2 : The model described in section 3.2
corresponds to the case with a leniency policy with fM = 0. Note that an intermediary
can always commit to going to court by choosing a D that is su¢ ciently large. Thus, if
D is unconstrained then leniency policies do not matter and the result characterized in the
previous section still holds; that is, intermediary always improves welfare when there are
only g types. If D is constrained so that the maximum damages that the rm can demand
is D 2 (F + kZ; F + kZ + fM), then the intermediary will not pay a bribe. In this case the
intermediary will only be employed by the rm in order to lower its navigation and court
costs. Specically, the intermediary will choose m to maximize,
k(m)m  F + k(m)Z;
which yields m = v+Z
2
: Note that in this case the rms fees increase by Z=4; therefore,
the participation rate of good types fall and not having leniency for the middleman is will
be welfare reducing. Thus, whether the rm applies for a license directly, or through an
intermediary, leniency policies can never lower welfare.18
18Another policy that we do not consider explicitly is penalties for negligence. Suppose the bureaucrat is
penalized for negligence, that is, for not granting a license to the g types: In this case, without intermediaries
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4.3 The Damage Clause"
Our model assumes that if the intermediary is unable to procure a license for the rm, then
it must pay damages D unless it appeals to the court. Arguably, the responsibility of the
legal action may rest on the rm since the rm is the one that has been wronged". In
this section, we outline a slight modication to our model in which the responsibility of legal
action rests with the rm. We show that the results of section 3.1 and 3.2 are robust to the
possibility of the rm choosing to sue the intermediary for damages.
Consider a model identical to that outlined in section 2 and 3, except that the decision to
sue the rm for damages in the event of not receiving a license rests with the rm. The cost
of taking the intermediary to court is identical to those identied earlier: : Further, when
an h type rm sues the intermediary for these predetermined damages, D; the intermediary
can defend itself in court by hiring legal counsel, where the cost structure of these legal fees
is identical to those described in section 3. If an h type rms sues the intermediary, it
is awarded damages D with probability ; where  is the conditional, joint, probability of
receiving these damages (conditional on the rm taking the intermediary to court and the
intermediary hiring its legal defense). The probability  represents the possibility that courts
are imperfect and may occasionally grant damages even to h type rms. An intermediary
that doesnt defend itself will have to pay damages to the rm with certainty.
In this alternative framework, as long as D > , all h type rms go to court. For, the
intermediary, as long as (1   )D > Z + F
2
, it will prefer to go to court rather than pay
these damages. Combining these two inequalities yields, D > Z + F
2
+ : Sparing the reader
tedious algebra, it follows that mh =
v
2
+ (Z+e+D)
4
; while mg remains the same as (7). Thus,
allowing for the rm to sue the intermediary implies that the intermediary takes on more
risk when contracting with h types. Consequently, the intermediarys costs and hence its fees
for h types are higher in this version of our model. Given that the fees for h types is higher,
fewer h types will enter into an agreement with the intermediary and all else being equal
the intermediarys prot will be smaller in this version of the model than that in expression
(14) : Consequently, the critical number of g types needed to subsidize the entry of h types
will need to be higher. That is, ng; will be larger. Thus, for intermediate values of ; our
model is robust to the possibility that the responsibility of legal action rests with the rm.
all rms with v > maxf; g will participate. Further, it can be shown that with an intermediary, the
intermediary will charge a fee of m = v=2: If the intermediary is protable, then it wil be welfare enhancing.
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4.4 Empirical Evidence
We provide below some simple descriptive statistics to highlight the role of intermediaries in
the context of our theoretical model. These data involve occurrences of violations of the U.S.
Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPAimposes civil and criminal penalties
for any U.S. person or corporation to make a corrupt payment to any foreign government
o¢ cial, directly or indirectly to obtain or retain business(OMelveny 2009). In 1986 the
scope of this act was extended to include FCPA violations for any foreign nationals acting
as intermediaries of a U.S. business. Under this extension a U.S. rm may be prosecuted
under U.S. law for the corrupt practices of any of its intermediaries. The data, collected
by the authors from the U.S. Department of Justice, includes cases between 1998 and 2007.
It shows that intermediaries were employed in slightly over 40% of all corrupt transactions
(among instances of corruption where the D.O.J. brought charges).19 As can be seen from
Table 1, the bribes paid to foreign o¢ cials in the presence of intermediaries is, on average,
higher than those paid when rms use intermediaries to facilitate corrupt transactions 1.20
Mean bribe (USD) Mean bribe (Euro)
Intermediary present 2,749,500 (90) 582,314 (6)
Intermediary absent 351,185 (46) 173,583 (25)
This nding is consistent with our model. If bribes through the intermediary are higher,
we should expect these rms to prefer to bribe bureaucrats directly (instead of through the
intermediary). However, a higher average bribe with intermediaries will be observed if the
market has both g and h types, and the intermediary o¤ers its services to both groups.
More formally, our theoretical model predicts that in the absence of intermediaries only
good types will pay bribes, therefore, the expected (average) bribe is 
2
:With intermediaries
the intermediarys fees must satisfy 
2
+   mg. Further, for the intermediary to make a
prot, (kg  mg) must be strictly greater than Bg; that is, mg  Bgkg : Combining these two
inequalities it follows that, 
2
+  > Bg
kg
:
19All details are available from: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html
20Sample sizes are in parenthesis, and since some bribes were paid in Euros while others in USD, they are
presented separately. It should be noted that this data is not a random sample since it includes only those
cases that came to the attention of the U.S. D.O.J. Further, cases where the D.O.J. did not have evidence
of the exact (or approximate) bribe amount paid were dropped, as were cases where there was ambiguity
regarding the use of an intermediary.
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If intermediaries only provide services to good rms either (1) 
2
+  > F+kgZ
2kg
> 
2
or (2)

2
+  > 
2
> F+kgZ
2kg
:Noting that F+kgZ
2kg
= Bg
kg
;case (1) along with our model implies that the
following chain of inequalities,

2
<
Bg
kg
< mg <

2
+ 
must be satised. This chain of inequalities implies that  > mg   Bgkg ; where mg  
Bg
kg
is
the intermediarys prot per (good) rm However, in this case the intermediary can earn a
higher prot by only o¤ering to reduce the rms navigation costs (since it can charge each
rm up to ), and rms will bribe bureaucrats on their own. Thus, case (1) implies that
intermediaries will not engage in bribery.
Under case (2), 
2
+  > 
2
> F+kgZ
2kg
; that is, the average bribe without an intermediary
is greater than the average bribe with an intermediary if there are only good types. This is
inconsistent with our data unless there are both good and harmful types. With both good
and harmful types the average bribe with an intermediary is,
F + kgZ
2(kg + kh)
+
kh(Z + e)
2(kg + kh)
;
which can be greater than bribes without an intermediary (
2
) if e is su¢ ciently large.21 Thus,
our model is consistent with the empirical nding that average bribe without an intermediary
is greater than the average bribe.
It should be noted, however, that these empirical observations should be viewed as merely
suggestive. Clearly, there are alternative models that could be consistent with these statistics
and more careful analysis needs to be done before these results may be seen as conclusive.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of intermediaries in facilitating corrupt transactions and pre-
venting hold-up. Although the previous literature has studied the role of intermediaries in
enabling corruption, none of these papers have examined the mechanism through which in-
termediaries prevent hold-up. Our analysis of intermediation highlights the mixture of both
21Our model also predicts that the bribes will be independent of v, the rms prots, although it is di¢ cult
to verify this.
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legal and illegal services that middleman o¤ers and how it is di¢ cult to separate these two
aspects.
We show that in the absence of intermediaries only good rms enter the market, and
harmful rms are dissuaded from entering the market because bureaucrats can hold-up their
license applications. In the presence of intermediaries who lower navigation costs, the number
of good rms increase. Thus, if only good rms are present, and the potential number of good
rms is su¢ ciently large so that intermediaries can prot from them, then intermediaries
unambiguously improve social welfare.
When both good and bad rms are present, we show that intermediaries can employ
the legal elements of their business (i.e. services to good rms) in order to prevent hold-
up from occurring to harmful rms. Intermediaries always receive a higher prot from
serving both types of rms and, therefore, procure licenses for both good and harmful rms.
Thus, the possibility of hold-up no longer prevents harmful rms from entering the market.
Hence it is clear that the legal arm of the middleman is pre-requisite for the illegal arm to
function. Interestingly however, because intermediaries prot from both types of rms, the
existence of harmful rms has a positive impact on the participation of good rms by making
intermediation viable for a larger range of parameter values. Thus, in contrast to models
of adverse selection where the bad drives out the good, in our model good and bad rms
complement each other through an intermediary. Specically, the presence of harmful rms
raises the protability of intermediation and makes it viable, enabling more good rms to
enter the market, and good rms in turn make it possible for harmful rms to avoid hold-up,
thereby encouraging more harmful rms to enter the market.
With regard to the welfare e¤ects, we nd that since more good and harmful types
enter the market in the presence of an intermediary, the welfare costs of intermediaries are
ambiguous in general. However, we show that as long as the navigation costs are su¢ ciently
large, intermediaries will enhance welfare even when both types of rms are present.
Our paper also examines whether bribe giving by intermediaries should be made legal,
in certain circumstances. The prior literature shows that legalizing bribe giving (for some
types of bribes) can reduce corruption (Basu 2011), however, it has not examined whether
such policies should be extended to intermediaries who pay bribes on behalf of rms. Our
paper shows that if only good rms are present, then leniency policies will enhance welfare
even in the presence of intermediaries.22
22Note that when only good rms are present, all bribes are extortionary (or harassment bribes), hence
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It has been argued that eliminating intermediaries can reduce corruption. Although,
intermediaries provide illegal services, they also o¤er legal services sometimes even to the
same rm. Indeed, although our model considers a market with many rms, it can be
interpreted more broadly as a single rm with several license applications, some of which are
legal and others illegal. For example, a real estate developer may apply for several building
permits, some of which may be legal, while others illegal. Our model shows that these
legal services can be used as leverage against the bureaucrat in order to prevent hold-up
among the illegal applications. In fact, our analysis can be applied in several other contexts
such as the delivery of developmental goods and services, and the implementation of public
programmes. In all these contexts, intermediaries serve both as informational navigator and
bribe facilitator. Our analysis shows that eliminating intermediaries is not the most e¢ cient
way to reduce corruption.
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Figure 1: Game tree for the game with only g-types (no intermediaries) 
*Note that this box represents a cooperative game phase. 
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